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Abstract 
The openness of the immigration policy toward developing countries is strongly debated in industrialized countries. In 
this paper we build an indicator of the "revealed" migration policy openness by computing the difference between the 
observed migration flows and the structural migration flows that depend on non-political factors of migration 
(economical, geographical and cultural factors). Using OECD's annual data on migrations, the indicator is built for 21 
industrialized countries over the period from 1990 to 2006, allowing us to compare the restrictiveness / openness of 
policies between countries and over time.
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       1 
1- Introduction 
 
Immigration from developing countries is a burning issue in industrialized countries, though it 
accounts  for  only  a  third  of  migration  flows  in  the  world  (Parsons  et  al.,  2007).  Despite 
economic  globalization,  the  development  of  transport  networks,  and  the  lasting  huge 
difference  in  incomes  between  countries,  annual  immigration  flows  from  developing 
countries represent less than one per cent of the population in industrialized countries. These 
figures might reflect the restrictiveness of immigration policies in industrialized countries. 
Moreover immigration flows from developing countries strongly differ between industrialized 
countries (see Figure 1): the annual averages range from 1.6 per 1000 people in Japan to 7.9 
per 1000 people in Austria. However, it is difficult to compare the restrictiveness of migration 
policies between countries based solely on these figures, since migration flows depend on 
structural determinants that are independent from policies. For instance, the limited flows to 
Japan may also reflect the geographical distance between this country and the developing 
countries.  
 
Figure 1: Immigration flows from developing countries  


















































































































































Notes: Austria and Italy from 1996 ; Ireland from 1991 ; New-Zealand from 1995, Portugal 
from 1992. Sources: authors’ calculations from OECD and Eurostat data. 
 
In this paper we build an indicator for industrialized countries of the “revealed” openness of 
migration policy by computing the difference between the observed migration inflows and the 
“structural” migration inflows that result from the non-political or structural determinants of 
migration. These “structural” migration inflows are the fitted values derived from a regression 
of observed inflows on economic, geographic and cultural determinants. The residuals of this 
regression, the migration inflows that remain unexplained by the regression, represent the 
impact of the migration policy and can then be used to build an indicator of this policy. Using 
OECD’s  annual  data  on  migrations,  the  indicator  is  built  for  21  industrialized  countries 
between 1990 and 2006, allowing us to compare policies between countries over time. 
   2 
2- Methodology 
There are two methods for building a policy indicator. The first consists of analyzing the 
policy instruments and the second of analyzing the quantitative results of the policy. The first 
method is used by Mayda and Patel (2004), Mayda (2009), and Ortega and Peri (2009) to 
build indicators of the changes in the destination countries’ migration policies based on a 
qualitative assessment of their laws. They then distinguish the timing of the « substantial » 
changes (loosening / tightening) in the migration policies by countries. However, this method 
suffers  from  a  high  degree  of  subjectivity,  as  questions  about  policy  instruments  and  the 
assessment of the changes can be ambiguous. In addition, it is difficult to compare all of the 
characteristics  of  policies  between  countries  and  to  derive  a  quantitative  and  synthetic 
indicator.  
The second method can go in two different directions. First, as in Roodman (2009) in the 
Commitment to Development Index, the indicator can be based on the uncorrected observed 
migration  flows.  However,  as  migration  flows  depend  on  other  factors  than  policy,  this 
indicator is not appropriate to assess the impact of the policy alone. The second direction that 
we follow consists of correcting the observed flows for the impact of structural factors of 
migration. 
 
2.1- The indicator of revealed policy 
This method has recently been used to build an indicator of trade policy’s openness (Combes 
and Saadi-Sedik 2006) or an indicator of the policy against deforestation (Combes Motel et al. 
2009).  We  start  with  an  econometrical  regression  of  the  observed  migration  inflows  in 
countries i and year t (Mit) on the structural determinants of migration (Xit):  
Mit = βXit + Pit                (1) 
We  then  consider  that  the  residual  of  the  regression  (Pit),  that  can  be  derived  from  the 
estimation, represents the impact of migration policies:  
Pit = Mit –β ˆ Xit                 (2) 
For a given country, migration policy is then considered as relatively restrictive (open) if 
observed  migration  flows  are  lower  (higher)  than  the  predicted  flowsβ ˆ Xit,  resulting  in  a 
negative (positive) value of Pit.  Since the sum of the residuals is equal to zero, Pit is an 
indicator  of  the  relative  migration  policy,  allowing  the  comparison  of  the  openness  or 
restrictiveness between countries (and over time). According to this method, the “revealed 
policy” includes direct restrictions on migration inflows (quotas, visas, etc.) and the impact of 
integration  policies,  which  modifies  the  attractiveness  of  the  destination  country  besides 
structural determinants.  
The migration policy restrictiveness measure being a residual, similar in spirit to the famous 
Solow’s  residual,  different  assumptions  underlie  the  validity  of  the  indicator.  First,  no 
explanatory variables must be omitted from the regression such that the residual accurately 
reflects the effect of immigration policy. Second, the included explanatory variables must be 
exogenous. Third, the functional form of the regression must be specified correctly. Fourth, 
there  must  be  no  measurement  error.  Given  the  restrictiveness  of  these  assumptions,  our 
results must be considered as preliminary and with caution. Our list of structural variables, 
which gathers the variables usually found in previous empirical studies, is not definitive and 
should be revised according to improving data availability. Arguably however, our structural 
variables might be considered as exogenous since immigration policies cannot influence them 
instantaneously. We partially acknowledge these shortcomings when only considering and 
discussing residuals that are statistically different from zero 
1.  
                                                 
1 We have greatly considered the comments of one of the referees of the Bulletin to improve this presentation.    3 
 
2.2- Structural determinants of international migration 
The selection of the determinants follows the works of Clark et al. (2004, 2007), Hatton and 
Williamson (2005 and 2006), Mayda (2009), Pedersen et al. (2008), and Ortega and Peri 
(2009). This selection covers the factors affecting the benefit and the cost of migration, and 
the (destination-countries’) pull and (origin-countries’) push factors. The benefit of migration 
is proxied by the difference of income per capita between origin and destination countries, 
allowing for a reverse U-shaped relation between the origin countries’ income and migration 
flows: an increase in the origin countries’ income raises the possibilities to migrate at low 
levels of income and reduce the benefits of migration above a threshold level (Faini 1996, and 
Hatton and Williamson 2005 and 2006). The unemployment rate in destination countries may 
also negatively affect the benefits of migration. The costs of migration depend mainly on the 
geographical  distance  between  the  origin  and  destination  countries.  Migrants  may  also 
privilege destination countries where an international language is spoken. Lastly, migration 
from developing countries may be facilitated by network effects (Massey et al. 1993, and 
Pedersen et al. 2008) like social networks, due to existing communities of migrants in the 
destination countries, and trade networks due to trade relations with the destination country.  
 
Table 1 : Variables annual averages (1990-2006) 




Distance  Unempl.  Language 
  (per 1000)  $ PPP  % GDP  kms  %   
Austria  7.9  101  30546  3001  83  2785  4.0  0 
Germany  7.2  94  28186  6340  59  3133  8.5  0 
Switzerland  6.2  102  33456  6340  78  3059  3.4  1 
Canada  5.5  107  30224  6784  71  5736  8.7  1 
Luxembourg  5.5  57  57052  6340  234  3236  2.8  1 
N-Zealand  5.5  84  21534  2920  59  9615  6.7  1 
Spain  5.0  41  23299  4094  49  3313  16.5  1 
Australia  4.1  92  29348  2699  39  8373  7.8  1 
Sweden  4.0  70  27353  6340  76  3300  6.9  0 
Norway  3.5  42  40912  6340  72  3522  4.5  0 
Denmark  3.4  38  29954  6340  79  3229  6.4  0 
Netherlands  3.4  68  30733  6340  119  3375  5.2  0 
USA  3.2  104  36593  4126  24  6984  5.5  1 
Italy  3.0  22  26164  4094  46  3139  10.4  0 
Belgium  2.5  48  28466  6340  148  3350  8.0  1 
Portugal  2.5  41  18129  4094  65  3637  5.6  0 
UK  2.3  51  26787  6340  55  3571  6.9  1 
Ireland  2.2  16  27546  6340  146  3920  9.2  1 
Finland  2.0  15  25357  6340  67  3239  10.8  0 
France  1.7  69  27620  4094  49  3564  10.5  1 
Japan  1.6  11  28208  2699  21  4620  3.8  0 
Mean  3.6  47  29879  5159  78  4224  7.2   
Notes : From 1992 for Japan, 1994 for Netherlands and Sweden,  1996 for Belgium, Finland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland and UK, 1997 for Ireland and New Zealand, 1998 for Spain and 
1999 for Austria. For Canada, results are obtained for 1992, then from 1996 ; for France : 1991 and 
from 2000 ; for Norway : 1991 and from 1994 ; and for USA : 1991 and from 1995.  
Sources : Author’s calculations, World Bank, OECD, IMF, National statistical agencies 
   4 
2.3- Data 
We use aggregated data on migration inflows by destination countries, instead of bilateral 
flows,  since  the  aim  is  to  build  directly  a  synthetic  indicator  of  migration  policy  for 
destination countries. Table 1 reports the average of annual data for migration inflows and for 
structural  determinants.  Annual  migrant  inflows  from  developing  countries  are  computed 
using data from OECD database from 1990 to 2006, completed by data from Eurostat, the 
World Bank and national sources. Immigrants are those who are foreign born. Therefore the 
figures are not biased by naturalization. This data excludes asylum seekers (this migration 
does not have the same determinants than the “common” migration) and illegal immigrants. 
Illegal immigrants’ regularizations are however registered as legal migration inflows. Using 
legal migration data in our method is relevant, as the restrictiveness of migration policy must 
be measured through its impact on observed legal migration inflows (not on unobserved total 
migration inflows). The same data sources allow us to compute the annual stocks of migrants 
(per thousand inhabitants). 
The destination countries’ GDP per capita is measured on the basis of purchasing power 
parity (see appendix for data details and sources). Distance from the origin countries and the 
origin countries’ GDP per capita are destination-country specific. The destination countries 
differ because they do not face the same “natural” sources of migration, that we consider to be 
the three closest developing regions (developing regions being North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa,  South  Asia,  East  Asia,  Central  America,  Latin  America,  and  East  Europe/Middle 
East). The average distance (in kilometers) is then computed between the destination country 
and  its  three  closest  developing  regions.  For  each  destination  country,  the  average  origin 
countries’ GDP per capita is computed as the average of the three closest regions’ GDP per 
capita. The dummy variable “Language” takes the value of 1 if English, French or Spanish is 
spoken in the destination country (0 otherwise). The destination countries’ trade openness is 
the ratio of exports to and imports from developing countries to GDP.  
 
3- Results 
3.1- Regression estimates 
The panel data regression takes the following general form:  
Mit = c+ βXit + αi +θt+ εit             (3) 
with αi  being the specific country effects (unobservable countries’ characteristics that are 
time invariant), and θt the specific time effects (unobservable time characteristics that are 
common for countries). The regression is run following the “random effects” model (against 
the “fixed effects” model), since all important structural determinants have been included in 
Xit. Thus αi  and θt  are components of the migration policy with εit. This choice is not rejected 
by the usual Hausman-test (associated probability: 0.19). As a robustness check, we present 
the regression under fixed effects. However, under fixed effects, specific country and time 
effects  are  then  considered  as  part  of  structural  determinants:  residuals  and  the  policy 
indicator should therefore be affected.  
To avoid endogeneity bias, we introduce the lagged values of GDP per capita, trade openness, 
stock  of  immigrants  and  unemployment.  Results  shown  in  Table  2  are  obtained  from  a 
Generalized Least Squared estimation. Results are broadly consistent with existing findings. 
Regarding the pull factors, the impact of the destination country’s income is significant and 
positive as expected. For the pull factors, the impact of the origin countries’ income shows a 
reverse U-shaped relationship that has been already highlighted by Faini (1996), Hatton and 
Williamson (2005), and Mayda (2009). Regarding the factors affecting the cost of migration, 
geographic distance has a negative impact on migration inflows, which is a standard finding. 
The international language is not significant however. This is consistent with the correlation   5 
between language and migrant stock in the destination country and the significance of the 
variable  of  migrant  stocks  in  the  regression 
2.  Migration  inflows  increase  with  the  trade 
openness of destination countries as in Pedersen et al. (2008). Beyond previous studies that 
found  a  linear  positive  relation  between  the  initial  migrant  stock  and  current  migration 
inflows,  we  found  a  reverse  U-shaped  relation  suggesting  diminishing  marginal  benefits. 
Lastly,  unemployment  in  the  destination  country  has  the  expected  negative  impact  on 
migration  inflows  (as  in  Mayda  2009,  and  Pedersen  et  al.  2008).  Altogether,  structural 
variables  only  explain  37%  of  the  variance  in  the  observed  migration  inflows  between 
countries. The rest is then assumed to be explained by the difference in migration policies 
applied by destination countries. 
The fixed effects estimation reported in the second column of Table 2 broadly gives similar 
results despite the exclusion of time invariant variables (distance and language). In the next 
section, the robustness of the policy indicator to random / fixed effects is discussed.  
 
Table 2: Estimation results (dependent variable is migration inflows Mit) 
  GLS estimation  Fixed effects estimation 
  Coefficients  t-statistics  Coefficients  t-statistics 
p.c. GDP destination     0.539      (1.22)     2.014 *     (1.87) 
p.c. GDP origin     4.839      (1.40)     6.352 **     (2.16) 
p.c. GDP origin squared    -0.309 **     (-2.12)    -0.457 *     (-1.81) 
Distance     -0.331 **     (-2.23)       
Language destination    -0.047     (-0.35)       
Trade openess destination     0.067 *      (1.93)     0.453 *      (1.70) 
Migrants Stock     0.938 **      (2.04)    -0.883     (-0.76) 
Migrants Stock squared    -0.144 *     (-1.90)    -0.302 *     (-1.79) 
Unemployment destination    -0.324 ***     (-3.08)    -0.401 *     (-1.84) 
Constant    -14.59     (-0.83)    -0.086      (-1.11) 
Ner Observations  245  224 
R²  0.37  0.51 
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
 
 
3.2- The policy indicator 
Table 3 reports the 1990-2006 average values of regression residuals for each destination 
country. Countries are then ranked in increasing degree of policy restrictiveness. The results 
show  that  the  most  open  countries  are  Spain,  Austria,  Germany,  New-Zealand,  and 
Luxembourg,  and  the  most  restrictive  are  Japan,  the  United  States,  the  Netherlands,  the 
United Kingdom, and France. According to the policy indicator, Spain is even more open than 
suggested by the observed migration inflows. Italy appears to apply an open policy while 
observed inflows are relatively low. At the opposite, for countries at the bottom of the table, 
migration  inflows  are  well  below  those  that  are  predicted  by  their  levels  in  structural 
variables,  and  they  then  appear  to  apply  relatively  closed  policies  toward  the  developing 
countries’ migration. Figure 2 reports the annual values for each destination country. 
                                                 
2 As suggested by one of the referees, the importance of the language in the destination country may be 
correlated with the existing social networks in the destination country. If there are already many migrants from 
the source country, then the importance of the language spoken in the destination country may not be an 
important factor in migration decision. These new migrants can still survive without speaking the destination-
country language.   6 
We also compute for each destination country the 1990-2006 average values of regression 
residuals generated by the fixed effects estimation reported in Table 2. These residuals are 
reported in Appendix – Table 5. Results are only marginally affected except for Luxembourg, 
which is relatively open under random effects and closed under fixed effects. 
 
Table 3: Indicator of migration policy restrictiveness vs observed migration inflows  
(annual 1990-2006 averages) 
  Policy indicator  Observed inflows  Rank 
  value  rank    per 1000  rank  difference 
Spain   5.1***  1  5.0  7  +6 
Austria   3.3***  2  7.9  1  -1 
Germany   2.3***  3  7.2  2  -1 
N.-Zealand   1.7***  4  5.5  4  0 
Luxembourg   1.6***  5  5.5  4  -1 
Italy   0.9*  6  3.0  14  +8 
Canada   0.5  7  5.5  4  -3 
Australia   0.3  8  4.1  8  0 
Finland  -0.2  9  2.0  19  +10 
Ireland  -0.2  10  2.2  18  +8 
Denmark  -0.5  11  3.4  11  0 
Switzerland  -0.6  12  6.2  3  -9 
Sweden  -0.6  13  4.0  9  -4 
Norway  -0.7*  14  3.5  10  -4 
Portugal  -0.9**  15  2.5  15  0 
Belgium  -1.3**  16  2.5  15  -1 
Japan  -1.3***  17  1.6  21  +4 
USA  -1.4***  18  3.2  13  -5 
Netherlands  -1.7***  19  3.4  11  -7 
France  -1.8***  20  1.7  20  0 
UK  -2.2***  21  2.3  17  -4 
Notes : Residuals averages. From 1992 for Japan, from 1994 for Netherlands and Sweden, 
from 1996 for Belgium, Finland, Italia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and UK, from 1997 
for Ireland and New-Zealand, from 1998 for Spain and 1999 for Austria. For 1992 and from 
1996 for Canada, for 1991 and from 2000 for France, for 1991 and from 1994 for Norway, 
for 1991 and from 1995 for the USA.  
*** significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Sources : Authors’ calculations. 
 
Our findings are broadly in line with other evidences. The relative openness of Austria, Spain, 
Germany and New Zealand and the restrictiveness of Netherlands, France and UK is well 
established  in  Roodman  (2009)  over  the  years  2000s.  The  openness  of  Germany  is  also 
documented  in  Ortega  and  Peri  (2009).  In  some  cases  however,  our  results  are  quiet 
divergent. For example, contrarily to Roodman’s Index, Italy is relatively open and the USA 
are relatively closed according to our policy indicator. These differences would be explained 
by the difference of methodology. Contrarily to Roodman’s Index that is broadly based on 
observed inflows, we take into account the structural attractiveness to reveal the policy stance. 
Observed inflows are low in Italy (high in the USA), but the structural attractiveness of Italy 
is low (high for the USA), so that migration policy is in fact open in Italy (closed in the USA).    7 
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Notes: A positive (negative) value means that the migration policy is relatively open (closed).  
Sources: Authors’ calculations.   8 
4- Conclusion 
Our  indicator  allows  the  comparison  of  migration  policy  restrictiveness  between 
industrialized countries and over time. This quantitative, synthetic and relative indicator is an 
alternative to existing indicators of migration policy based on subjective assessments or on 
uncorrected observed migration flows. It allows a comparison of policies based on the overall 
impact of quantitative restrictions but also of integration policies (that affects the destination 
countries’  attractiveness).  This  indicator  shows  that  migration  policy  restrictiveness 
significantly  differs  between  industrialized  countries,  and  even  between  European  Union 
countries. The most open countries appear to be Spain, Austria, Germany, New-Zealand, the 
most restrictive being Japan, the United States, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and France. 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Definitions of the variables 
Variables  Definitions  Sources of primary data 
Migration inflows from 
developing countries 
Ratio of migration inflows from developing 
countries to destination country population 
OECD, The World Bank, 
Eurostat, National sources 
Destination countries’ income   Per capita GDP (PPP USD)  The World Bank 
Origin countries’ income 
Average of Per capita GDP  of the three closest 
developing regions.  
The World Bank 
Distance between destination 
and origin countries  
Average  of  orthodromic  distances  between 
countries  
CVN 
Destination countries’ trade 
openness 
Ratio  of  import  from  and  export  to  developing 
countries to destination country GDP 
OECD, 
The World Bank  
International language 
 
Equal to 1 if an international language is spoken 
in  the  destination  country  (english,  spanish  or 
French), 0 otherwise. 
 
Stocks of migrants in destination 
countries 
Ratio of the number of migrants from developing 
countries to destination countries population 
OECD, The World Bank, 
Eurostat, National sources 
 
Table 5: Indicator of migration policy restrictiveness  
Random (GLS) vs fixed effects estimations 
  Policy indicator  Policy indicator  Rank 
  GLS  FIXED EFFECTS  difference 
  value  rank  value  rank  GLS - FE 
Spain   5.1***  1   6.8***  1  0 
Austria   3.3***  2   4.5***  2  0 
Germany   2.3***  3   3.9***  3  0 
N.-Zealand   1.7***  4   2.7***  4  0 
Luxembourg   1.6***  5  -2.6***  19  -14 
Italy   0.9*  6   0.2  9  -3 
Canada   0.5  7   2.2***  5  2 
Australia   0.3  8   1.5**  6  2 
Finland  -0.2  9  -1.2*  13  -4 
Ireland  -0.2  10  -1.8**  18  -8 
Denmark  -0.5  11  -1.2**  14  -3 
Switzerland  -0.6  12   0.4  7  5 
Sweden  -0.6  13   0.4  8  5 
Norway  -0.7*  14  -3.1***  21  -7 
Portugal  -0.9**  15  -0.1  10  5 
Belgium  -1.3**  16  -0.9  12  4 
Japan  -1.3***  17  -3.1***  20  -3 
USA  -1.4***  18  -1.6**  16  2 
Netherlands  -1.7***  19  -1.4**  15  4 
France  -1.8***  20  -0.6  11  9 
UK  -2.2***  21  -1.7**  17  4 
Notes : Residuals averages. From 1992 for Japan, from 1994 for Netherlands and Sweden, from 1996 
for Belgium, Finland, Italia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and UK, from 1997 for Ireland and 
New-Zealand, from 1998 for Spain and 1999 for Austria. For 1992 and from 1996 for Canada, for 
1991 and from 2000 for France, for 1991 and from 1994 for Norway, for 1991 and from 1995 for the 
USA. *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Sources : Authors’ calculations. 